IN response to Prof. Jonathan Moyo’s social media post below: while it is historically correct that Zimbabwe did not conduct direct presidential elections between 1980 and 1990, the constitutional significance of that fact cannot be assessed in isolation from the institutional design within which it operated. Constitutional interpretation requires fidelity not only to text, but to structure, theory, and the evolving logic of democratic legitimacy.
By Brighton Musonza
The Lancaster House Constitution established a parliamentary executive model firmly rooted in Westminster traditions. Within that framework, democratic legitimacy was neither absent nor diluted; it was simply mediated through representative institutions. Executive authority derived from parliamentary confidence, itself anchored in universal suffrage elections. The Prime Minister, rather than the President, embodied the locus of executive power. Consequently, legitimacy flowed through legislative representation and political accountability mechanisms characteristic of parliamentary democracies. To suggest that the absence of direct presidential elections during this period implies democratic deficiency risks imposing a presidentialist evaluative lens upon a constitution that was not presidential in character.
Crucially, constitutional legitimacy cannot be detached from the functional identity of political offices. Prior to Amendment No. 7, the Zimbabwean presidency did not constitute an executive authority in the substantive sense. It was largely ceremonial, operating within a structure that deliberately separated symbolic headship from operative governance. In comparative constitutional theory, ceremonial heads of state frequently emerge through indirect mechanisms without any corresponding legitimacy crisis. The United Kingdom, Germany, and numerous parliamentary democracies illustrate that democratic validity does not inherently depend upon direct election of non-executive heads of state. Retrospectively framing Zimbabwe’s earlier arrangement as anomalous, therefore, reflects a category error: evaluating a parliamentary constitution using standards appropriate to executive presidentialism.
Presidential Election Titbits
Between 1980 and 1990 the head of the executive in Zimbabwe was not directly elected. The direct election of the President was first introduced in 1990 under Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No.7 (Act 23 of 1987) which inaugurated the Executive…— Prof Jonathan Moyo (@ProfJNMoyo) February 11, 2026
The constitutional transformation introduced by Amendment No. 7 marked not a correction of illegitimacy but a structural reconfiguration of state authority. Executive power migrated decisively from Parliament to the presidency, fundamentally altering the separation of powers. In that altered institutional landscape, the logic of democratic legitimacy necessarily evolved. Direct election became a rational consequence of expanded presidential authority rather than evidence that earlier mechanisms had been constitutionally defective. Democratic theory demands congruence between power and accountability; where executive authority is concentrated in a single office, the electoral mandate must correspondingly assume greater directness. The shift, therefore, reflected institutional adaptation rather than normative repudiation.
Comparative reliance upon Angola’s constitutional model introduces further complexities that resist reductionist analogy. Comparative constitutional law cautions against superficial equivalences grounded solely in electoral form. Indirect election systems vary profoundly in their democratic implications depending upon the surrounding constitutional ecosystem. Angola’s post-2010 framework, though formally described as indirect, operates through automatic executive investiture tied to party list outcomes. This mechanism fuses executive authority with partisan ordering in ways that raise substantive legitimacy concerns. When voters cast ballots for party representation without a discrete opportunity to evaluate executive leadership, the conceptual distinction between legislative choice and executive mandate becomes attenuated.
The democratic risks inherent in such arrangements are not abstract. In dominant-party contexts, automatic executive investiture may reinforce power concentration by insulating executive authority from independent electoral scrutiny. The absence of a distinct presidential contest can diminish personalised accountability, weaken competitive differentiation, and entrench party-centric control over executive succession. Legitimacy, in modern constitutional thought, encompasses more than procedural compliance; it incorporates meaningful voter agency, political equality, and the capacity for democratic contestation. Electoral systems that blur institutional mandates must therefore be assessed not merely by legality but by their effects upon democratic responsiveness.
Moreover, constitutional legitimacy is inherently dynamic. Democratic constitutionalism evolves alongside societal expectations, institutional maturation, and normative developments within regional and global frameworks. Within Southern Africa, constitutional trajectories increasingly reflect aspirations toward expanded participation, electoral clarity, and reinforced accountability structures. Comparative examples cannot function as normative absolutes detached from broader democratic evolution. The mere existence of an indirect system elsewhere does not resolve the constitutional question of whether such a model optimally advances democratic deepening within a given polity.
At its core, constitutional discourse must distinguish between permissibility and desirability. A constitution may lawfully prescribe indirect election, yet legitimacy remains contingent upon whether institutional arrangements adequately express popular sovereignty, preserve political competition, and sustain effective constraints on power. Democratic legitimacy is not exhausted by adherence to procedural design; it is continually renegotiated through the lived interaction between citizens and governing institutions.
In sum, the analytical weakness of the original argument lies in equating electoral modality with democratic virtue. The decisive constitutional inquiry is not whether indirect presidential election can be historically or comparatively justified, but whether it coheres with contemporary principles of accountability, institutional balance, and substantive democratic choice. Constitutional legitimacy resides not in the mechanics of selection alone, but in the architecture of restraint, responsiveness, and the enduring capacity of institutions to reflect the sovereign will of the people.
