LUSAKA — Zambia’s presidential election is unfolding against the backdrop of a much bigger contest over the country’s economic future, with its vast copper resources placing the southern African nation increasingly at the centre of competition between China and the United States.
President Hakainde Hichilema is seeking a second five-year term after taking office in 2021, when Zambia was struggling with a sovereign debt crisis and had defaulted on its external obligations. His administration has since overseen a debt-restructuring process, fiscal reforms and efforts to attract new investment into the mining sector.
But the election is about more than whether Hichilema’s economic programme deserves another term. It is also taking place as global powers increasingly view Zambia through the strategic importance of copper and other critical minerals required for electric vehicles, renewable energy, power infrastructure and advanced manufacturing.
Copper puts Zambia on the geopolitical map
Zambia is one of the world’s major copper producers, making the country strategically important to both Beijing and Washington.
China has established a substantial presence in Zambia’s mining industry and broader economy, while the United States has increasingly sought partnerships with African countries capable of supplying critical minerals and reducing dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains.
The geopolitical importance of Zambia has consequently increased as demand for copper rises alongside the global energy transition.
For China, Zambia is part of a wider African economic network involving mining, processing, infrastructure, trade and investment.
For Washington, the country offers an opportunity to diversify critical-mineral supply chains away from China while strengthening American commercial and strategic influence in Africa.
That makes the outcome of Zambia’s election relevant well beyond Lusaka.
Hichilema’s economic record faces the voters
Hichilema is campaigning on the argument that his government inherited an economy in crisis and has restored macroeconomic stability.
His administration has pointed to fiscal consolidation, debt restructuring, increased investor confidence and stronger economic prospects as evidence of progress.
The IMF has projected medium-term growth of around 5.3%, supported partly by mining investment, agriculture and improvements in electricity generation. The Fund has also described Zambia’s public debt as sustainable, although the country remains at high risk of overall and external debt distress and continued fiscal discipline is considered essential.
Hichilema’s government has also set an ambitious target of doubling the size of the Zambian economy, ending load-shedding and creating millions of jobs.
But the economic recovery has not eliminated public frustration.
High living costs, unemployment, electricity shortages and concerns about whether ordinary Zambians are benefiting sufficiently from the country’s mineral wealth remain important electoral issues. The copper sector has become particularly sensitive because expectations of a mining boom have raised questions about who will ultimately capture the additional wealth.
The copper question
The central economic question facing the next government is increasingly becoming what Zambia does with its copper rather than simply how much copper it produces.
International investors have announced major mining commitments, with almost US$10 billion reportedly earmarked for the sector and plans to substantially increase production by 2031.
That creates an opportunity to move beyond the traditional model of exporting mineral concentrates and develop greater domestic capacity in processing, refining, manufacturing and mining-related services.
For Zambia, the distinction is crucial.
A larger copper industry can increase export earnings and government revenues. But deeper domestic value chains could create industrial capacity, skilled employment, technology transfer and a broader manufacturing base.
This is precisely why the country’s mineral strategy has become intertwined with the geopolitical competition between China and the United States.
China’s established position
China enters the contest with a considerable advantage: it already has deep commercial relationships with Zambia.
Chinese companies have been involved in Zambian mining for decades, while Chinese capital, contractors, infrastructure companies and trading networks have established extensive links with the country’s economy.
China’s interest is also not limited to ownership of mines. Its influence across critical-mineral supply chains extends into processing, infrastructure, logistics and markets.
For Beijing, maintaining reliable access to African copper is strategically important as China seeks to protect the industrial supply chains underpinning its manufacturing economy.
Washington seeks an alternative supply chain
The United States, meanwhile, is approaching Zambia through the increasingly strategic lens of critical minerals.
Washington’s objective is not necessarily to displace China overnight, but to develop alternative sources of supply and establish commercial relationships with mineral-producing countries.
The Trump administration’s emphasis on critical minerals has intensified this approach.
Yet US-Zambia relations have also encountered difficulties. Lusaka suspended negotiations over proposed multi-billion-dollar US agreements covering health services and minerals after Zambian officials objected to what they described as unacceptable American demands and preferential treatment.
That episode illustrates the increasingly transactional nature of global competition for African minerals.
Zambia is seeking investment, technology, infrastructure and markets while trying to preserve room to determine how its natural resources are developed.
Lusaka wants partnership, not another dependency
The election therefore presents Zambia with a delicate diplomatic balancing act.
The country does not necessarily have to choose between Washington and Beijing.
Instead, the challenge is to extract maximum economic value from competition between them.
Chinese companies can bring capital, mining expertise, infrastructure and access to Chinese markets. American and Western investors can provide alternative capital, technology, processing expertise and access to markets seeking to diversify critical-mineral supply chains.
For Zambia, the strongest negotiating position may lie in having multiple competing investors rather than becoming dependent on any single geopolitical bloc.
That could give Lusaka greater leverage over investment terms, local processing requirements, employment, taxation and infrastructure development.
A vote with consequences beyond Zambia
The election is therefore taking place at an important moment for the global copper market.
Zambia is not simply choosing a president. It is deciding how the country intends to manage the next phase of its economic development after debt restructuring and whether the expected mining boom can translate into broader industrialisation.
The next government will have to balance foreign investment against national interests, expand electricity generation, improve transport infrastructure and ensure that mining revenues translate into tangible economic opportunities.
At the same time, it will have to navigate an increasingly competitive international environment in which copper is no longer merely a commodity — it is a strategic asset.
For China, Zambia represents an established economic relationship and an important source of minerals.
For the United States, it represents an opportunity to build a more diversified critical-minerals supply chain.
For Zambia itself, the stakes are arguably even higher: whether its copper wealth finally becomes the foundation for industrial transformation rather than another cycle of exporting raw materials while importing finished products.
The election will determine who gets to make those choices for the next five years.
