THE proposed exit of Econet Wireless Zimbabwe Limited marks one of the most consequential capital-markets events in Zimbabwe in more than a decade, and one that stands out even when assessed against regional and global precedents. At a 152 per cent premium to the 30-day volume-weighted average price (VWAP), the offer represents not merely a delisting, but an extraordinary liquidity and value-realisation event in a market that has been structurally unable to deliver either on a sustained basis.
By Brighton Musonza
To place the magnitude of this premium in perspective, it is approximately twice the highest delisting premium recorded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) over the past five years, and more than four times the South African average of roughly 37 per cent. Within Zimbabwe itself, the contrast is even starker.
Recent Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) exits have typically delivered low double-digit premiums of around 15 per cent, and in some instances have occurred at outright discounts to prevailing market prices. Econet’s proposal therefore, represents a decisive break from both local precedent and regional norms.
A Market Context Defined by Structural Impairment
The significance of Econet’s offer cannot be properly understood without reference to the condition of the ZSE itself. Since the over 70 per cent market collapse in 2022, the exchange has remained structurally impaired. Liquidity has been persistently thin, price discovery erratic, and real returns elusive. For many investors, capital losses sustained during that collapse have never been recovered, and the market has failed to perform its most basic economic functions: channelling savings into productive capital and rewarding long-term investment.
Over the past five years, the ZSE has struggled to generate meaningful real returns across most counters, even as nominal prices periodically adjusted for inflation and currency effects. Against this backdrop, Econet’s proposal offers shareholders something the broader market has consistently failed to provide: a single, time-certain opportunity to exit at a material premium, with genuine liquidity and clear value crystallisation.
In effect, Econet is not merely exiting the exchange; it is compensating shareholders for years of structural market failure.
Comparing Zimbabwe and South Africa: A Stark Premium Differential
The tabulated data underscores just how anomalous Econet’s offer is when compared with JSE precedents. Recent South African exits—such as Barloworld (83 per cent premium), Bell Equipment (82 per cent), and Sasfin Holdings (66 per cent)—are already considered generous by developed-market standards. Even so, they fall far short of Econet’s 152 per cent premium.
Further down the spectrum, a broad range of JSE delistings—including African Phoenix Investments, Astoria Investments, ARC Investments and ARB Holdings—cluster between 20 and 40 per cent premiums, reinforcing the South African average of approximately 37 per cent. Zimbabwean comparables are weaker still. NTS delivered a premium of roughly 15 per cent, while National Foods exited at a discount of 10 per cent, highlighting the inconsistent and often punitive outcomes faced by local investors.
In this comparative context, Econet’s proposal does not simply exceed expectations; it resets the benchmark for what constitutes fair value and equitable treatment of minority shareholders in a frontier market.
Liquidity Versus Obligation: A Misplaced Critique
Criticism of Econet’s proposed transaction has, at times, been framed as concern over the loss of a major liquidity anchor on the ZSE. This framing, however, fundamentally misdirects the debate. It implicitly assumes that Econet exists primarily to sustain trading volumes on an exchange that has struggled to function effectively, rather than to allocate capital efficiently and maximise shareholder value.
That assumption is flawed. No listed company, particularly one operating in a capital-intensive, technology-driven sector, has a fiduciary duty to compensate for structural deficiencies in a national equity market. The responsibility for market liquidity, depth and confidence rests with policy frameworks, monetary stability and institutional credibility, not with individual issuers.
To argue otherwise is to invert the logic of capital markets and to absolve systemic failures by shifting their burden onto corporate balance sheets.
Infrastructure Unbundling: A Globally Proven Strategy
Econet’s strategy must also be understood within the global context of telecommunications infrastructure unbundling, a well-established and value-accretive capital allocation approach. Across Europe and the United States, integrated telecom operators have systematically separated tower and passive infrastructure assets into standalone vehicles, recognising that such assets are structurally misvalued within operating companies.
In Germany and Austria, Deutsche Telekom unbundled GD Towers and sold a 51 per cent stake to Brookfield Infrastructure and DigitalBridge in 2022 for approximately US$19 billion, monetising assets that had been undervalued within the parent group. Similarly, Vodafone Group carved out its European tower portfolio into Vantage Towers in 2021.
While Vodafone’s own equity performance between 2021 and 2025 remained broadly flat, delivering a negative to zero compound annual growth rate, Vantage Towers’ equity value grew from an implied €12.1 billion at listing to approximately €19.2 billion by 2025, representing a CAGR of just over 10 per cent per annum.
Italy offers a parallel example. Telecom Italia’s unbundling and listing of INWIT in 2015 produced a dedicated infrastructure platform whose market capitalisation expanded from around €2.2 billion at listing to €7–8 billion by 2025, implying an annualised equity growth rate of approximately 12.4 per cent—even as Telecom Italia’s own equity languished.
These outcomes are not anomalies. They reflect a structural reality increasingly recognised by global capital: long-duration, capital-intensive infrastructure assets are better valued, financed and scaled outside integrated operating entities.
Global Capital Is Voting With Its Chequebook
The scale of capital flowing into infrastructure strategies further reinforces this thesis. In 2022, KKR raised approximately US$17 billion for infrastructure funds, while Global Infrastructure Partners raised around US$25 billion in 2025. This is not speculative capital chasing novelty, but long-term institutional money seeking predictable cash flows, inflation hedging and asset-backed returns.
Econet’s approach therefore aligns squarely with prevailing global capital allocation logic. To portray it as unconventional or destabilising is to ignore both empirical evidence and investor behaviour across developed markets.
Fiduciary Duty and the Imperative to Act
As articulated by Carl Icahn in King Icahn by Mark Stevens, corporate management has a clear and non-negotiable mandate: to maximise shareholder value. Executives are stewards of other people’s capital, and when assets are persistently mispriced—or when market structures fail to recognise intrinsic value—decisive action is not optional. In such circumstances, inaction is not prudence; it is a breach of fiduciary responsibility.
Viewed through this lens, Econet’s proposed exit is neither reckless nor novel. It is a rational response to a prolonged period of market dysfunction, executed in a manner that delivers shareholders an outcome the market itself has been structurally incapable of providing.
A Rare Capital-Allocation Outcome
Ultimately, the Econet transaction stands as a rare example of shareholder-centric capital allocation in a frontier market. It delivers exceptional value relative to local and regional benchmarks, provides genuine liquidity in a time-certain manner, and aligns with globally validated strategies for unlocking infrastructure value.
In doing so, it also exposes an uncomfortable truth: the controversy surrounding the transaction says less about Econet’s strategy than it does about the limitations of the market it proposes to leave behind.
