Introduction: The authority to govern is not the authority to act without rules. The statement issued by the War Veterans raises a fundamental question of constitutional governance within ZANU-PF: can the party’s leadership alter the constitution that governs its own authority without complying with the procedures prescribed by that constitution?
By Terence Maphosa
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This is not merely a dispute about political personalities, succession or the balance of power within the party. It concerns the source, limits and lawful exercise of institutional authority. At its heart lies a principle common to constitutional government and the governance of voluntary associations: those entrusted with administering an institution remain subject to the rules that establish their offices and define their powers.
A constitution is not simply a declaration of political aspirations. It is the foundational instrument that establishes the institution, creates its organs, allocates authority among them and prescribes how decisions of fundamental importance must be made. Its authority cannot logically depend on whether its provisions are convenient for those who happen to hold office.
The central legal question is therefore not whether ZANU-PF may amend its constitution. It plainly must be possible for a political party to revise its governing instrument through a lawful process. The question is which organ may initiate, consider, approve and ratify an amendment, and what mandatory procedures must be followed before that amendment acquires constitutional validity within the party.
1. What the ZANU-PF Constitution says about amendment
Any serious constitutional argument must begin with the relevant provisions of the party’s own constitution, rather than with political assertions about what the leadership or its critics believe ought to happen.
The publicly accessible 2014 version of the ZANU-PF Constitution contains two particularly relevant provisions. Article 5 identifies Congress as the party’s supreme organ and expressly gives it the power and authority to amend the party constitution. Article 7, section 37(8), also provides that the Central Committee may amend the constitution, if deemed necessary, subject to ratification by Congress. These provisions must be read together, rather than treating the authority of one organ as though it extinguishes the role of the other.
The significance of section 37(8) is particularly important. Even where the Central Committee exercises the power to amend, the provision makes ratification by Congress a condition of that power. The Central Committee is not described as possessing an unrestricted power to make constitutional amendments final and effective entirely on its own authority.
However, the 2014 text is not, by itself, conclusive proof of the precise wording of the amended constitution currently in force. ZANU-PF’s President and First Secretary referred publicly in May 2026 to the party’s amended 2022 constitution. The operative 2022 text, including its amendment provisions, must therefore be examined before the older wording can be relied upon as a definitive statement of the current rules.
The War Veterans’ statement advances a more detailed interpretation of the amendment procedure. According to their account, a member must move a proposed amendment, secure the support of at least 50 members, and have the proposal proceed through the District Coordinating Committee and Provincial Executive Committee. The statement further describes a 90-day period before the Secretary-General convenes the Central Committee to consider the recommendation, after which the matter is referred through the relevant party organs and ultimately to Congress for ratification.
That sequence should be tested against the actual wording of the applicable constitutional provisions and any valid regulations made under them. If the current constitution prescribes those steps, they are not optional administrative formalities. They are conditions governing the lawful exercise of the amendment power.
Equally, if the current constitution expressly confers an amendment power on the Central Committee subject to Congress ratification, that provision must be given its proper effect. It would be legally unsound to ignore it or to assume that the older and newer texts contain identical wording without verification.
The correct constitutional argument is therefore not that one organ must necessarily be excluded from the amendment process. It is that every organ must exercise only the powers conferred upon it, in the manner prescribed by the constitution currently in force.
2. The distinction between managing the party and amending its constitution
A second fundamental distinction concerns the difference between the administration of a political party and the exercise of constituent authority.
The ZANU-PF website describes the Politburo as the standing committee of the Central Committee, responsible for implementing decisions, directives, rules and regulations issued by the Central Committee. It describes the Central Committee as the party’s principal organ between Congress sittings.
These institutional descriptions are relevant because they distinguish implementation from the authority to make or ratify fundamental constitutional changes. An organ entrusted with executing decisions does not automatically acquire every power possessed by the body whose decisions it implements.
The Politburo may have an important role in coordinating party business, providing political direction and implementing decisions taken by the appropriate organs. But the existence of those functions does not, without an express constitutional provision, establish that it may independently originate, adopt or conclusively ratify constitutional amendments.
The distinction is elementary but decisive: administrative authority is not necessarily constituent authority.
If the party constitution assigns a particular step to the membership, a district structure, a provincial structure, the Central Committee or Congress, another organ cannot simply substitute itself for the designated body because it considers the alternative process more expedient.
The question is not whether the Politburo is politically influential. It plainly is. The question is whether the constitution grants it the particular power being exercised.
Political influence cannot, by itself, create constitutional jurisdiction.
3. The amendment procedure is part of the constitution, not an obstacle to it
The War Veterans’ position rests on the proposition that the prescribed amendment procedure must be respected before the party’s foundational rules are changed.
That principle has considerable constitutional force. A constitution may confer substantive powers while simultaneously imposing procedural conditions on their exercise. The procedure is not separate from the power; it helps define the lawful boundaries of that power.
Where a constitution requires a motion, a specified level of support, consideration by designated structures, a prescribed period, a Central Committee decision or ratification by Congress, those requirements determine how the amendment authority is to be exercised.
If the applicable provision is mandatory, bypassing it cannot be justified merely by asserting that the proposed amendment is desirable, politically necessary or consistent with the wishes of senior leadership.
Nor does a majority within one organ necessarily possess the authority to dispense with a procedure that the constitution reserves to another organ. A majority may make a valid decision within its jurisdiction, but numerical strength does not automatically enlarge that jurisdiction.
The relevant legal inquiry is therefore twofold. First, what does the current constitution require? Second, can the proponents demonstrate that each mandatory requirement has been fulfilled?
A failure to establish compliance would raise a serious question about the validity of the resulting amendment. Whether a court or competent party tribunal would ultimately declare the amendment invalid would depend on the governing text, the facts and the applicable law.
4. Why the membership cannot be reduced to spectators
The War Veterans’ statement also raises a question about the constitutional position of ordinary party members.
A political party is not merely the property of its current office-bearers. It is an organisation whose constitution establishes the relationship between members and the organs that represent or administer them. Members accept obligations under the constitution, but those obligations operate alongside the rights and procedures that the same constitution provides.
ZANU-PF’s own published account of its structures describes a hierarchy extending from cells and branches through district and provincial structures to the Central Committee and Congress.
That structure matters when constitutional amendments are being considered. Where the constitution gives members a defined means of initiating proposals or requires proposals to pass through subordinate structures, those provisions provide an institutional channel through which members can participate in the party’s constitutional development.
To disregard such a channel, if it is mandatory under the applicable constitution, would raise a legitimate question about whether the party’s own rules had been observed.
The point is not that every member must personally approve every amendment. Nor does it mean that every constitutional question must be decided by a nationwide membership vote. The point is narrower and legally more defensible: members and party organs must be afforded the procedural role that the constitution actually assigns to them.
A party cannot demand strict constitutional obedience from its members while treating the same constitution as dispensable when the leadership wishes to change the rules governing the institution.
5. The significance of the Central Committee and Congress
The relationship between the Central Committee and Congress is central to this dispute.
The publicly available 2014 constitution identifies Congress as the supreme policy-making organ and gives it authority to amend the party constitution. It also permits the Central Committee to amend the constitution, subject to Congress ratification.
If that arrangement remains materially unchanged in the applicable 2022 text, it would support an important distinction: the Central Committee may have authority to undertake an amendment at an intermediate stage, but Congress retains a constitutionally specified role in ratifying it.
Under such an arrangement, a Central Committee resolution cannot automatically be treated as the final constitutional act where ratification remains outstanding. Equally, the precise legal status of a proposal before ratification would depend on the wording of the relevant provisions.
This is why the exact text matters. The legal analysis must establish whether the current constitution provides for a member-led initiation process, a Central Committee amendment power, Congress ratification, or a combination of these mechanisms. It must then determine how those provisions interact.
It would be premature to conclude that the Politburo has no role whatsoever in the process without examining the applicable clauses. It would be equally premature to conclude that a Politburo decision alone is sufficient to amend the constitution without identifying the provision that grants it that authority.
The constitutional burden is to demonstrate the source and limits of each power, not merely to assert it.
6. Constitutional alignment does not dispense with constitutional procedure
ZANU-PF’s Legal Affairs Secretary has publicly said that the party is reviewing its constitution to align it with changes to the national Constitution and that the proposed amendments are expected to be presented to the National People’s Conference for consideration under the party’s procedures.
That stated objective raises two separate issues which should not be conflated.
The first is whether the party considers changes to its constitution necessary to reflect amendments to the national Constitution. That is a matter of substantive policy and legal alignment.
The second is whether the party’s proposed changes are being processed in accordance with its existing constitution. That is a question of internal constitutional procedure.
The first does not automatically answer the second. Even if an amendment is considered necessary to achieve legal consistency, the necessity of the outcome does not, by itself, establish that every procedure used to achieve it is valid.
The same principle applies to administrative law, corporate governance and public institutions: a decision may pursue a legitimate objective and still be vulnerable if the decision-maker lacks the relevant authority or fails to comply with a mandatory procedure.
Accordingly, the proponents of the review should be able to identify the party resolution authorising the process, the constitutional provision under which it was initiated, the role assigned to each organ, and the mechanism through which the proposed amendments will be approved and ratified.
That is not obstruction. It is evidence of constitutional compliance.
7. The national Constitution and the party Constitution are distinct instruments
It is also necessary to distinguish the Constitution of Zimbabwe from the constitution of ZANU-PF.
The national Constitution establishes the legal framework of the state. The party constitution establishes the internal rules of the political organisation. The two instruments operate in different legal contexts, even where changes to the former create a practical reason to review the latter.
An amendment to the national Constitution does not, merely by existing, rewrite the internal constitution of a political party. The party must still establish how any required changes to its own governing instrument are to be made under the rules applicable to it.
The argument is straightforward: a change in the external legal environment may create a reason to amend internal rules, but it does not automatically eliminate the procedures governing that amendment.
If ZANU-PF wishes to align its constitution with the national Constitution, it must identify the legal basis for doing so and comply with its own amendment provisions. Any question about the validity of the national constitutional amendment itself is a separate issue and should not be confused with whether the party has followed its internal rules.
This distinction allows the internal constitutional dispute to be examined on its own merits, without assuming that the validity or invalidity of one instrument automatically determines the validity of the other.
8. The importance of transparency and an auditable process
Where constitutional amendments have significant implications for party leadership, internal representation or the allocation of institutional powers, transparency becomes especially important.
A constitutionally sound process should make it possible to establish what was proposed, who was authorised to propose it, which organs considered it, what decisions were taken, whether any prescribed waiting periods were observed, and whether the required ratification occurred.
The party should therefore be able to publish or make available the operative constitutional provisions, the proposed amendments and the resolutions or records demonstrating compliance with the applicable procedure.
This would enable members to distinguish between a proposal, an amendment adopted provisionally by a designated organ, and an amendment that has completed all the steps required to become effective.
It would also reduce the scope for competing interpretations of the party constitution to become proxies for political conflict.
Transparency is not a substitute for compliance, but it makes compliance verifiable.
9. The legal test that should govern the dispute
The question should ultimately be resolved through the text of the applicable constitution and the documentary record of the amendment process.
Four questions are particularly important:
Initiation: Which member or organ is authorised to initiate a constitutional amendment under the current constitution, and what support or preliminary approval is required?
Consideration: Which structures must consider the proposal, and are any time limits, notice requirements or referral procedures mandatory?
Adoption and ratification: Which organ may adopt the amendment, and does the constitution reserve a final or ratifying role to Congress or another body?
Commencement: At what point does the amendment become effective, and have all the required procedural conditions been satisfied?
These questions should be answered by reference to the current constitutional text, not assumptions based on an earlier version, a political announcement or the institutional seniority of the persons advancing the proposal.
If the applicable constitution prescribes a procedure and the evidence demonstrates that it was bypassed, there would be a substantial basis for challenging the validity of the resulting amendment. If, on the other hand, the current constitution expressly authorises the procedure followed and all necessary conditions have been met, the legal objection would need to be assessed accordingly.
The law does not permit the answer to be predetermined by either the authority of the leadership or the sincerity of its critics.
Conclusion: The rules must govern the rule-makers
The War Veterans’ statement places a legitimate constitutional question before ZANU-PF: whether the proposed changes to the party constitution are being pursued through the procedures prescribed by the constitution itself.
The strongest legal case is not that the Politburo is inherently incapable of participating in constitutional reform, nor that every assertion made by the War Veterans must be accepted without scrutiny. It is that the authority of every party organ must be established by reference to the governing instrument, and that any mandatory procedural requirements must be respected.
The publicly available 2014 constitution is instructive because it assigns constitutional powers to Congress and gives the Central Committee an amendment role subject to Congress ratification. But the applicable 2022 text must be examined before those provisions can be treated as a definitive statement of the rules currently in force. The War Veterans’ more detailed account of the member-led procedure must likewise be verified against that text.
The principle nevertheless remains clear: no organ should be presumed to possess a power that the constitution does not confer upon it, and no mandatory procedure should be treated as optional simply because those in authority consider a different course politically expedient.
If the constitution requires a proposal to travel through specified structures, those structures must be respected. If it requires Central Committee action and Congress ratification, both stages must be addressed. If it prescribes a different lawful route, that route must be followed instead.
A constitution cannot credibly serve as the supreme governing instrument of a political party if its provisions bind ordinary members but become discretionary for those who administer the institution.
The ultimate test is not who possesses the greatest political influence, who has the largest following within a particular organ, or who can secure a resolution at a conference. It is whether the decision was made by the competent authority, through the procedure prescribed by the applicable constitution, and with all required conditions satisfied.
That is the constitutional question the party should answer before treating any proposed amendment as validly adopted.
Terence Maphosa is a Harare-based political and constitutional law analyst
