BANGKOK — Zimbabwe is positioning itself at the centre of an emerging effort to rebalance the international sovereign debt system, as developing countries establish a new multilateral platform intended to challenge decades of unequal negotiating power between borrowers and creditors.
Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube, according to CNBC Africa, has called for a fundamental reassessment of the global financial architecture, arguing that the developing world’s debt crisis is increasingly a problem of financing structures, borrowing costs and institutional representation rather than simply excessive government borrowing.
His intervention comes as finance ministers, central bank governors and senior officials gather in Bangkok, Thailand, for the inaugural Governing Council meeting of the Borrowers’ Platform on October 12, alongside the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
The initiative, launched in Washington in April, brings together developing economies seeking a stronger collective voice in decisions affecting sovereign debt management, restructuring and development finance.
For Zimbabwe, which has spent more than two decades struggling with external payment arrears and restricted access to international credit, the initiative represents an opportunity to influence the rules governing the financing system it is attempting to re-enter.
Yet the country’s immediate debt-resolution prospects will continue to depend on its own economic reforms, creditor negotiations and the availability of financing to clear outstanding obligations.
The broader significance of the Borrowers’ Platform lies in its attempt to address an enduring institutional imbalance: creditors have established mechanisms for coordination, while debtor nations have historically negotiated with considerably less collective support.
A US$12.3 trillion debt problem moves to the centre of global diplomacy
The scale of the challenge is substantial.
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, developing countries’ total external debt reached approximately US$12.3 trillion in 2025, an increase of US$508 billion from the previous year.
External debt servicing amounted to approximately US$1.6 trillion during the same period.
Although aggregate debt-service payments declined from their 2023 level, the improvement was uneven, with interest costs on long-term external debt increasing by almost 14%.
The distinction is important.
A reduction in principal repayments by a small number of large economies can lower the aggregate debt-service figure without materially improving the financial position of poorer countries.
For heavily indebted developing economies, the cost of servicing existing obligations continues to compete with expenditure on infrastructure, healthcare, education and climate resilience.
UNCTAD estimates that least developed countries devoted 17.6% of government revenue to servicing external public and publicly guaranteed debt in 2025.
Their external debt-service payments also absorbed approximately 18.2% of export earnings.
These figures illustrate how sovereign debt can become a constraint on economic development even when borrowing was originally intended to finance productive investment.
Ncube, writing in an opinion article published by CNBC Africa on October 11, argued that the existing financial system has created persistent disadvantages for poorer borrowing countries.
He contended that developing nations face structural inequalities in access to finance, creditor coordination and representation within the institutions governing international lending.
His argument is that sovereign debt sustainability cannot be assessed independently of the terms on which countries obtain financing and the institutional arrangements determining how debt crises are resolved.
Why borrowing costs matter more than headline debt ratios
One of the most consequential aspects of Ncube’s argument concerns the distinction between the size of a country’s debt and its capacity to service that debt.
In his commentary, he cited Zimbabwe’s external debt obligations at approximately 29.7% of gross domestic product, with total debt equivalent to roughly 43% of GDP in 2025.
These ratios are not exceptionally high by international standards.
Several advanced economies sustain considerably larger public debt burdens relative to their economic output.
However, comparisons based solely on debt-to-GDP ratios can be misleading.
Debt sustainability also depends on borrowing costs, repayment schedules, the currency composition of liabilities, fiscal revenues, export earnings and the government’s access to refinancing.
A country borrowing at low interest rates in its own currency faces a fundamentally different risk profile from an economy whose obligations are denominated in foreign currency and whose access to international financial markets is restricted.
The United States, for example, benefits from issuing debt in the world’s principal reserve currency and from the depth and liquidity of its Treasury securities market.
Zimbabwe does not enjoy comparable advantages.
Its external borrowing constraints are compounded by historical payment arrears, while much of its economic activity and financial intermediation remains denominated in US dollars.
Consequently, even a comparatively moderate debt-to-GDP ratio can coexist with severe liquidity constraints and limited fiscal space.
For Zimbabwe, the binding problem is not merely the stock of debt but the difficulty of accessing affordable financing while resolving overdue obligations.
A borrower counterpart to the Paris Club?
The establishment of the Borrowers’ Platform is intended to address a longstanding gap in international financial coordination.
For decades, creditor governments have used institutions such as the Paris Club to coordinate their approach to sovereign borrowers.
The G20 Common Framework, introduced in 2020, also provides a mechanism for eligible countries seeking debt treatment involving participating official creditors.
These arrangements are designed to facilitate negotiations and coordinate creditor positions, although their effectiveness has varied.
Borrowing countries, meanwhile, have generally lacked a permanent cross-regional institution dedicated to sharing debt-management expertise and developing common positions on international financial reform.
The new Borrowers’ Platform seeks to address that asymmetry.
UNCTAD, which serves as the initiative’s secretariat, says it will facilitate exchanges of information, technical cooperation, peer learning and collective engagement on debt policy.
The initiative is not designed to replace the Paris Club, the G20 Common Framework or existing creditor negotiations.
Nor does it have the authority to compel creditors to reduce debts or accept restructuring proposals. Its immediate value is therefore institutional rather than financial.
By improving the quality of debt data, strengthening technical expertise and facilitating cooperation, participating countries may be better equipped to negotiate with creditors and assess the consequences of different financing arrangements.
That could become particularly important for countries dealing simultaneously with bilateral lenders, multilateral institutions, commercial banks and bondholders.
Bangkok meeting establishes a new governance structure
The inaugural Governing Council meeting marks the transition from the platform’s establishment to its operational phase.
According to UNCTAD, the initiative was launched in April 2026 with participation from more than 30 countries and the support of United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres.
Its development followed recommendations from the UN Secretary-General’s Expert Group on Debt and commitments made through the 2025 Sevilla financing-for-development process.
Countries including Egypt, Pakistan, Colombia, Honduras, Maldives, Nepal and Zambia participated in the preparatory work.
The platform has a two-tier governance structure.
Its Governing Council, comprising finance ministers, central bank governors and equivalent senior officials, provides political direction.
A Steering Committee is responsible for technical and operational coordination.
UNCTAD provides secretariat support, creating an institutional link with the wider United Nations system.
The Bangkok meeting is intended to formalise membership, establish leadership and agree on priorities for the initiative’s first annual cycle.
Membership is voluntary and open to eligible developing-country borrowers.
The platform’s eventual influence will depend on the breadth of participation, the quality of its technical work and whether members can maintain common positions despite differing economic circumstances.
The limits of collective action
The Borrowers’ Platform offers potential advantages, but its establishment does not eliminate the fundamental conflicts that complicate sovereign debt restructuring.
Borrowing countries differ considerably in their financial positions. Some have relatively strong market access and seek lower borrowing costs.
Others are already in default and require substantial debt treatment. A third group faces liquidity pressures but may remain solvent if refinancing conditions improve.
These differences can make it difficult to develop uniform negotiating positions. Creditors are similarly diverse.
Official bilateral lenders, multilateral institutions, commercial banks and bondholders operate under different mandates and contractual obligations.
A restructuring arrangement acceptable to one creditor group may not satisfy another.
The platform also faces a coordination challenge: improving borrowers’ negotiating capacity without creating the impression that it is an adversarial coalition against lenders.
Successful debt restructuring generally requires cooperation between borrowers and creditors.
The strongest contribution of the new institution may therefore lie in improving transparency, reducing information asymmetries and encouraging more predictable restructuring processes.
For lenders, better debt data and stronger borrower institutions can reduce uncertainty and improve assessments of repayment capacity.
For borrowing governments, improved technical expertise can help prevent the acceptance of financing arrangements that create unsustainable future obligations.
Zimbabwe’s debt problem is more complicated than the numbers suggest
Zimbabwe provides a particularly revealing example of the difficulties the platform is intended to address.
The country has been excluded from much of the normal international sovereign financing system for more than two decades.
According to the IMF’s May 2026 country report, Zimbabwe has experienced prolonged debt default and restricted access to international capital markets and most official financing for more than 25 years.
The consequences extend beyond the government’s ability to borrow.
Limited access to concessional financing constrains investment in electricity generation, water infrastructure, transport networks, healthcare and education.
It also increases pressure on the domestic budget to finance capital projects that might otherwise qualify for longer-term development funding.
For businesses, infrastructure deficiencies raise production costs and reduce competitiveness.
Mining companies require reliable electricity and transport infrastructure, manufacturers depend on affordable energy and efficient logistics, while agriculture needs irrigation, storage and access to markets.
Where the state cannot mobilise adequate long-term financing, these constraints can become persistent obstacles to private investment.
The economic cost of debt distress therefore cannot be measured solely through interest payments or outstanding principal.
It also includes the productive investment that does not take place because financing is unavailable.
IMF programme gives Zimbabwe a separate route towards normalisation
Zimbabwe’s participation in the global debate coincides with its own effort to establish a credible record of economic policy implementation.
In April 2026, the IMF approved a 10-month Staff-Monitored Programme intended to consolidate recent stabilisation gains and strengthen fiscal and monetary management.
The programme does not provide direct IMF financing.
Instead, it allows IMF staff to assess the government’s implementation of agreed policies, including expenditure controls, monetary discipline, public financial management and governance reforms.
The objective is to establish a credible policy record that could support future discussions on arrears clearance and debt restructuring.
In September, an IMF mission led by Wojciech Maliszewski reached a staff-level agreement with Zimbabwean authorities on the programme’s second review.
The agreement was subject to IMF management approval.
The IMF reported that programme implementation had been strong, although the government had fallen short of a target concerning protected social and priority expenditure.
That qualification matters because macroeconomic stabilisation must be accompanied by adequate protection of vulnerable households if reform programmes are to remain socially sustainable.
For Zimbabwe, successful implementation of the programme would represent progress towards financial normalisation, but it would not automatically result in debt forgiveness or the restoration of concessional lending.
The government still needs a credible financing arrangement, creditor cooperation and a sustainable framework for servicing future obligations.
The missing bridge between stabilisation and investment
Zimbabwe’s recent economic policy direction has placed greater emphasis on fiscal discipline, monetary restraint and exchange-rate stability.
These measures are intended to reduce uncertainty and restore confidence in the domestic financial system.
The IMF has acknowledged improvements in economic stability, supported by tighter monetary policy, stronger fiscal management and favourable conditions in parts of the external sector.
However, stabilisation is only the first stage of economic recovery.
An economy can achieve lower inflation and greater exchange-rate predictability while continuing to experience weak industrial investment, inadequate infrastructure and limited access to long-term credit.
The central policy challenge is therefore to convert macroeconomic stability into a sustained expansion of productive capacity.
For Zimbabwe, renewed access to development finance could help support that transition.
Concessional lending from multilateral institutions typically offers longer maturities and more favourable financing terms than many commercial borrowing arrangements.
Such funding can be particularly important for infrastructure projects whose economic benefits develop over many years.
However, the impact depends on the quality of investment decisions.
Borrowing for productive infrastructure can strengthen future economic output and government revenues.
Borrowing to finance inefficient projects, recurrent expenditure or poorly governed public enterprises can instead increase future repayment pressures without generating corresponding economic benefits.
Debt sustainability is therefore inseparable from the productivity of the assets financed through borrowing.
Why Zimbabwe’s US-dollar economy complicates sovereign financing
Zimbabwe’s extensive use of the US dollar introduces another dimension to the country’s debt challenge.
In a conventional monetary system, a government borrowing predominantly in its own currency operates within a financial environment shaped by domestic monetary policy, local capital markets and the capacity of its institutions to manage liquidity.
Zimbabwe’s multicurrency economy is different.
A substantial share of deposits, loans and commercial transactions is denominated in US dollars.
While dollarisation can provide a degree of transactional stability, it also limits the central bank’s ability to create foreign-currency liquidity or act as an unrestricted lender of last resort in dollars.
The government cannot independently issue US dollars to meet its external obligations.
It must obtain foreign currency through taxation, export-related economic activity, investment inflows, external borrowing or other available sources.
This makes foreign-exchange earnings and the availability of international financing particularly important.
Restoring access to concessional credit could therefore help relieve some of the economy’s external financing constraints.
But it would not, by itself, resolve the structural limitations of a highly dollarised financial system.
Zimbabwe would still need deeper domestic capital markets, stronger savings mobilisation and a financial sector capable of extending productive credit on sustainable terms.
Could debt resolution strengthen the ZiG?
The relationship between sovereign debt normalisation and Zimbabwe’s domestic currency is indirect but potentially significant.
The Zimbabwe Gold currency, or ZiG, operates alongside the US dollar in an economy where confidence in monetary policy remains central to the currency’s long-term prospects.
Improved relations with international financial institutions could support confidence by reducing uncertainty about the government’s external obligations and strengthening expectations of fiscal discipline.
Access to development finance could also reduce pressure on domestic resources, particularly where infrastructure investment would otherwise compete with recurrent public expenditure.
However, sovereign debt restructuring would not automatically increase demand for ZiG.
Currency demand depends on the currency’s usefulness in transactions, the credibility of monetary policy, expectations of purchasing-power stability and the availability of domestic financial instruments.
A more credible sovereign balance sheet can support these conditions, but it cannot substitute for them.
For Zimbabwe, the strongest long-term connection between debt resolution and currency stability would arise if improved financing conditions encouraged investment, productivity growth and greater confidence in domestic financial markets.
Debt restructuring and the cost of private capital
Sovereign creditworthiness can influence financing conditions throughout an economy.
When investors perceive a government as financially distressed, that risk can affect the pricing of loans, investments and commercial contracts involving businesses operating within the same jurisdiction.
This relationship is commonly described as the sovereign-risk premium.
A successful arrears-clearance programme could help reduce uncertainty about Zimbabwe’s external financial position.
Over time, improved sovereign credibility might make it easier for banks and businesses to negotiate international credit lines and investment financing.
However, the effect would depend on broader conditions.
Investors would continue to assess property rights, governance, contract enforcement, currency convertibility and the profitability of individual projects.
Consequently, a debt agreement would be an important step towards financial rehabilitation rather than a guarantee of immediate access to inexpensive commercial credit.
For Zimbabwean businesses, the potential benefits could emerge gradually through improved financing relationships, stronger infrastructure investment and greater confidence in the country’s economic outlook.
Africa’s development finance dilemma
Zimbabwe’s circumstances reflect a wider African challenge.
Many African economies require substantial investment in electricity, transport, water systems, agriculture and industrial capacity.
Yet the cost of borrowing can be significantly higher than in advanced economies.
UNCTAD’s 2025 assessment found that developing regions had been borrowing at rates two to four times those available to the United States since 2020.
The resulting difference in financing costs has major implications for long-term investment.
A project that is financially viable when funded through a low-interest, long-maturity loan may become uneconomic when financed through expensive commercial borrowing.
This is particularly important for infrastructure, where initial capital requirements are large and economic returns often emerge over decades.
High borrowing costs can therefore prevent projects from proceeding even when they would generate substantial long-term economic benefits.
The consequences can become self-reinforcing.
Insufficient infrastructure restricts productivity growth, weaker growth limits fiscal revenues, and constrained revenues make it harder for governments to finance the next generation of infrastructure.
Breaking that cycle requires both improved domestic policy and more affordable external financing.
The global development financing gap
The sovereign debt debate is also connected to the broader challenge of financing the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.
UNCTAD estimates that developing countries face an annual development financing gap of approximately US$4.3 trillion.
The shortfall includes requirements for infrastructure, climate adaptation, education, healthcare and other development priorities.
The gap is substantially larger than the resources currently available through traditional development assistance.
This has intensified calls for reforms to multilateral development banks, greater use of risk-sharing instruments and mechanisms that encourage private investment.
However, private finance cannot replace concessional public funding in every sector.
Projects such as rural water systems, public health infrastructure and basic education may generate substantial social returns without producing the commercial cash flows required by private investors.
For these investments, access to affordable sovereign or development finance remains essential.
The Borrowers’ Platform enters this debate at a time when developing countries are seeking greater influence over how international financing is allocated and priced.
The question of IMF and World Bank governance
Ncube’s argument also raises questions about representation within the Bretton Woods institutions.
The IMF and World Bank were established in 1944, when the distribution of global economic power differed substantially from today’s.
Their governance systems have evolved, but voting power remains linked to institutional quotas or shareholdings, giving larger economies considerable influence.
Developing countries have long argued that these arrangements do not adequately reflect their populations, financing requirements or changing economic importance.
The issue is not simply symbolic representation.
Institutional governance can influence priorities relating to lending instruments, conditionality, concessional financing and responses to debt distress.
Greater participation by borrowing countries could help ensure that policy frameworks take fuller account of development needs and the economic consequences of prolonged financial exclusion.
Nevertheless, the Borrowers’ Platform will not itself change IMF voting shares or World Bank capital structures.
Such reforms require separate decisions by the institutions and their member governments.
Its potential contribution is to provide a more coordinated voice in those discussions.
Debt transparency is equally important
A more balanced international debt system would also require improvements in the quality and availability of sovereign debt information.
Governments sometimes face complex obligations involving bilateral loans, commercial debt, guarantees, state-owned enterprises and other contingent liabilities.
Where information is incomplete, creditors may struggle to assess the true financial position of a borrower.
Borrowing governments can also find it difficult to negotiate effectively when they lack consolidated information about their own obligations.
The Borrowers’ Platform could help address these weaknesses through technical cooperation and the exchange of debt-management practices.
For Zimbabwe, greater transparency would be especially important in the management of public enterprises, government guarantees and liabilities that could eventually fall on the national budget.
The IMF’s programme has emphasised stronger governance and improved monitoring of fiscal risks, including those associated with state-owned enterprises.
Such reforms are not separate from debt restructuring.
They are part of establishing the credibility required for sustainable access to finance.
Domestic arrears must not be overlooked
Although international attention often focuses on external debt, Zimbabwe’s domestic payment obligations also matter for economic performance.
When government departments or public institutions delay payments to suppliers and contractors, the effects can spread through the private sector.
Businesses may struggle to pay employees, meet tax obligations or service bank loans.
Smaller enterprises are particularly vulnerable because they often have limited working capital and weaker access to alternative financing.
Domestic arrears can therefore undermine economic activity even when the government is pursuing fiscal consolidation.
The IMF’s programme places emphasis on expenditure controls and preventing the accumulation of new domestic arrears.
For Zimbabwe, a credible debt-resolution strategy must address both external financial relationships and domestic payment discipline.
Improved public financial management would help ensure that progress in one area is not undermined by renewed obligations elsewhere.
Climate shocks increase the urgency of reform
The sovereign debt challenge is becoming more complicated as climate-related expenditure requirements increase.
Countries exposed to droughts, floods and other extreme weather events may need to borrow for emergency relief while simultaneously investing in long-term resilience.
Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector is particularly vulnerable to rainfall variability. Climate shocks can affect food production, household incomes, export earnings and the government’s expenditure requirements.
A severe drought can reduce economic output while increasing demand for food assistance and agricultural support. This combination can weaken public finances precisely when additional resources are needed.
Concessional climate finance and appropriately structured debt instruments could help countries manage these risks.
However, climate-related borrowing must also be assessed against debt sustainability and the expected effectiveness of the projects financed.
The broader challenge is to ensure that financing for resilience does not create another cycle of unsustainable repayment obligations.
Can the Borrowers’ Platform change the balance of power?
The platform’s ultimate significance will depend on whether it moves beyond declarations of solidarity.
Its initial mandate is focused on knowledge-sharing, technical assistance and collective policy engagement.
Those functions can improve the negotiating position of borrowing countries, but they do not guarantee better financial terms.
For the initiative to influence the wider debt system, its members would need to demonstrate that coordinated borrower participation produces more reliable information, stronger debt-management institutions and constructive proposals for reform.
They would also need to maintain cooperation across regions and income groups.
A durable institution could help borrowing governments assess financing proposals more effectively, avoid repeated policy mistakes and engage with creditors on a more equal technical footing.
The benefits could extend to creditors through improved transparency and a lower risk of disorderly defaults. Yet the platform’s success will ultimately be measured by practical outcomes rather than institutional visibility.
For Zimbabwe, the relevant outcomes include progress towards arrears clearance, restoration of development financing, improved sovereign credibility and a stronger environment for productive investment.
Zimbabwe’s test: from international advocacy to economic reconstruction
Ncube’s support for the Borrowers’ Platform reflects a wider ambition to influence the international rules governing development finance.
Zimbabwe has a clear interest in a system that offers distressed borrowers more predictable restructuring procedures, affordable financing and meaningful participation in policy decisions.
But the country’s own economic reconstruction will depend equally on domestic policy choices.
Macroeconomic stability must be preserved, fiscal commitments must remain credible and public investment must generate measurable economic returns.
Restored access to international financing would create opportunities, but it would also impose responsibilities.
Borrowed resources would need to support infrastructure, industrial development, agricultural productivity and essential public services rather than reproduce the financial weaknesses that contributed to earlier debt distress.
The Bangkok meeting therefore represents two parallel developments.
At the international level, developing countries are attempting to establish a more permanent role in shaping the rules of sovereign finance.
At the national level, Zimbabwe is seeking to demonstrate that its economic reforms justify renewed confidence from creditors and development partners. The two agendas are complementary, but neither can substitute for the other.
A more equitable financial architecture may improve the opportunities available to Zimbabwe. Whether those opportunities translate into sustained economic development will depend on the country’s ability to turn financing into productive capacity.
For a nation seeking to rebuild its industrial base, deepen domestic capital markets and restore international financial relations, that is the difference between winning a stronger voice in global debt negotiations and achieving a durable economic recovery.
